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Frank fought along side me in Vietnam.[1] We shared a small tent with the squadron S-
3, we ate C-rations together, we dodged enemy fire together, we were friends, and, 
although he was ten years older, I was the “old man.” Frank was Catholic, and during 
religious services before an operation, he knelt and prayed in the front rank of the soldiers 
of that faith. He was a damn good soldier who knew the weapons of our squadron from A 
to Z. Best of all, he knew people--he knew soldiers and he knew the good and bad about 
most of them. 
A close observer of the officers of the squadron, Frank was quick to praise the best of our 
leaders and never said a bad word about anyone unless he knew that I had to know. He 
never initiated comments about officers, except in praise. He felt strongly that officer 
business was just that, officer business. 
Frank knew the other squadron noncommissioned officers like a book. He spent his time 
with the enlisted members of the squadron and he listened to them. When we talked I 
knew he was on the soldier frequency. Yes, he knew soldiers. 
In today’s Army, Frank would be classified as slightly overweight. But he was quick on 
his feet, never seemed to tire, was strong physically, and was absolutely fearless under 
fire. He carried a PRC-25 radio, an M16 rifle, lots of ammo, and web gear festooned with 
grenades. He had come up in the tanker ranks and had that great upper-body strength that 
comes from years of repairing broken track and humping 45-pound rounds. He was tough 
and he sweated a lot in Vietnam’s hot, humid climate. 
Frank got hit by enemy fire sitting beside me in a helicopter and never said a word. The 
crew chief got hit worse than he did, so when we landed Frank went to work putting a 
tourniquet on that youngster’s leg. Someone else found out about Frank’s wound and 
gave him first aid and evacuated him. He was a great Sergeant Major and he was 
invaluable to me. He is still a good friend and we drink a few beers at our annual reunion. 
Henry was my tank battalion Command Sergeant Major in Germany. He was the best 
tanker in the battalion. He knew more about the M-60 tank than the best turret mechanic, 
the best track mechanic, and everyone else in the battalion. He could also fix any vehicle 
in our TOE. He was a master carpenter, exceptionally strong physically, and could whip 
any soldier in the battalion--something, unfortunately, he would do occasionally when a 
soldier got out of line. 
Henry was the first true “master gunner” before that term was invented. When he 
inspected your tank and it was declared ready to shoot--it was ready! Our battalion 
qualified more tanks than any other in the theater during Henry’s tenure as Sergeant 
Major. Henry deserves most of the credit. 
Henry only had about three years of formal education. A south Georgia sharecropper’s 
son and the youngest of 11 children, he had gotten his high school diploma late by 
passing the Army’s GED test. The Army was Henry’s home. Although he was married to 
a charming lady and had a beautiful daughter, Henry spent most of his awake hours in the 
battalion area with his soldiers. He had uncommon common sense and an uncanny ability 
to judge people. Yes, he knew soldiers. 
The young officers in the battalion respected Henry and sought him out to learn about the 
tank. He was a soldier’s soldier but a little rough around the edges. He probably couldn’t 
make it through today’s Noncommissioned Officer Education System and doubtless 
could not qualify for the Sergeants Major Academy. But he was a great Sergeant Major 
and he was invaluable to me. 
Do we have these types of men in today’s Army? Do we want them? Has the day passed 
when an overweight and undereducated but thoroughly proficient soldier can be a 
Sergeant Major in our Army? Tough questions, with too many caveats to give a clear 
answer. 
A better question is why were the minor faults of these two great soldiers overlooked? 
The answer is as clear today as it was then--they knew their business! They dealt in 
soldiers’ problems daily and they cared about their soldiers. The young officers liked 
them, admired them, and trusted them. These young officers are now lieutenant colonels, 
and in visits with them the subject of the old CSM invariably comes up. They judge 
CSMs today by the same standard--do they know their business? But today a lot of our 
junior officers have an intense dislike and lack of respect for some of our CSMs. In many 
instances this disdain is shared by officers up through the colonel ranks. We’ll see why in 
a moment. 
The Army has CSMs today who are equally proficient and even better educated. Rarely 
is an overweight NCO of any grade promoted. Many of the better-known CSMs are long-
distance runners. Promotion boards have weeded out the undereducated, the fat, and the 
unfit. Rumor has it that in some circles, CSMs don’t drink more than two beers except in 
their own backyards. Even if the commander wanted to promote anyone overweight or 
undereducated, he would not be able to under today’s rules. Silver Stars and Purple 
Hearts and fighting skills don’t compute unless you’ve got the education and physical 
appearance to go with them. 
CSMs now are taught solutions to weightier problems than mere gunnery, maintaining 
equipment, small-unit tactics, and all the myriad other soldier skills essential on future 
battlefields. They are instead being groomed and prepared for service at brigade, division, 
corps, army, and even higher-level CSM duty--duty that is much harder to define and 
much more distant from the ranks. 
Although the highest enlisted rank achievable is E-9, CSMs have established a “CSM 
chain of command” from battalion level up to Sergeant Major of the Army. The selection 
process for these positions is highly competitive; the positions carry with them increasing 
privileges and the trappings of higher responsibility. Yet, there are damn few greater 
responsibilities than taking care of soldiers and preparing them for battle, and our newly 
exalted CSMs don’t do these things. 
It’s difficult to determine the specified duties of a CSM. For more than 20 years there 
was no official document on this subject. Now, there is AR 600-20, Army Command 
Policy and Procedures, which discusses the “NCO support channel” and describes the 
various NCO positions within that channel.[2] Also there’s a little pocket-sized field 
manual (FM 22-600-20) titled The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide, which 
discusses the NCO support channel and has some teasing things to say about “special 
considerations of NCO duties/responsibilities.”[3] But neither of these references answers 
the 64-dollar question concerning the length of the CSM’s leash. Indeed, Army policy is 
intentionally reticent on this score. In the words of AR 600-20, para. 2-3, it is left to the 
commanders themselves to “define responsibilities and authority of their NCOs to their 
staffs and subordinates.” But in a great number of cases. the actual commanders’ 
instruction papers for CSMs contain far too much about “rendering advice and initiating 
recommendations” (a favorite phrase in the AR and the NCO Guide) and assign very few 
hard-core responsibilities that do not overlap those of a lower commander. 
The Army needs the skills and talents of its superb noncommissioned officer corps down 
with the troops. It’s essential that we have them teaching and training our young soldiers. 
There is no calling more important. Can the Army put up with a group of senior NCO 
advisers with the power to critique, inspect, and comment on the performance of 
commissioned officers at lower echelons? No. And by permitting such the Army is daily 
undercutting its officer corps without realizing it. The Army is endangering the discipline 
required in its officer-NCO relationships. 
Problems generally start when an off-post CSM, obviously from a higher command, gets 
travel authority. You would think that the four-star general himself was coming if you 
were located in the billeting or messing area. If you happen to be a lowly battalion, 
brigade, or division CSM, then you are expected to escort this high-level visitor through 
your commander’s unit, knowing full well that all he sees may be reported to the higher-
level commander--good and bad. This is damned objectionable. Command inspections 
are not sergeants’ business. They are officer/commander business. No other army in the 
world sends sergeants to inspect officers’ areas of responsibility excepting, of course, the 
various formal technical inspection teams, on which NCOs play an essential role. It is the 
commander who is responsible for his unit--including the training and care of the 
privates, even though his NCOs are a primary means by which he carries out that 
responsibility. When did all this start and why have the senior leaders given our Army’s 
sergeants an inappropriate officer mission? 
Don is another old war horse of a Sergeant Major, and another close acquaintance. He 
was a running mate of Frank and Henry--all three, incidentally, now very successful in 
their second careers. They grew up together in the Army and their paths crossed many 
times all over the world. They often served in the same unit. What Don had to say about 
CSMs kind of “shoved the round home.” No tape-recording of our conversation exists, of 
course, only notes, but his words are accurately paraphrased as follows. 
“When I came into the Army in 1945,” Don began, “there was no mention of anyone 
called Sergeant Major. Most of the NCOs I met were either pre-World War II or from 
World War II. In fact, it was the early 1950s before I ever heard of a Sergeant Major. The 
sergeant that held that position in those days was usually an old soldier assigned to help 
the adjutant run the S-1 shop. The real power bloc rested among the First Sergeants, and 
in those days that was what all the good NCOs wanted to be--a First Sergeant. They 
wanted to be near soldiers and to help teach and lead young soldiers. We loved what we 
were doing. We were happy just to be allowed to serve. 
“But some smart folks in Washington decided that we needed the ranks of E-8 and E-9. 
They never asked us what we wanted, they just sat up there in Washington and decided 
that we needed our image enhanced. Hell, all we First Sergeants wanted was our own 
permanent rank so that we didn’t have to take our First Sergeant chevrons off and then 
sew them back on every time we PCS’d. 
“More money was appreciated, of course, but in a way it was a bribe, an insult to us. But 
it did one thing for the Army; it smoked out all the bums and slackers that were in it for 
personal gain. They had been hiding in ROTC, recruiting, and reserve advisor duty for 
years. These clowns saw a quick pay raise before retirement, and they flocked back to fill 
the newly created Command Sergeants Major slots.” 
The old soldier stopped a moment, lost in his memories, and then continued. “The real 
problem with all this was with you officers trying to build us up, to help our morale. So 
you decided to call these new positions Command Sergeants Major. And the dumb ones 
believed in the title. They began to act like commanders. They began issuing orders like 
commanders and holding meetings and such, and later they copied you officers and began 
to hold conferences. But the cold, hard facts are that they don’t command squat; never 
have, never will, and they need to be told that once a day.” 
Don was beginning to get worked up. “Take the ‘command’ out of the title. They should 
be called Battalion Sergeants Major or Brigade Sergeants Major, but not ‘command’ 
anything. Hell, most of the ones I know today think they are too important to salute a 
lieutenant, but by regulation, in the pecking order of legal rank, they come right behind a 
warrant officer. 
“And another thing. The Sergeants Major Academy ought to be teaching them that they 
are still NCOs. I met one recent graduate of that place, all pumped full of himself for 
having successfully acted as the Division Ammunition Officer during some map exercise 
he had been through out there. The poor dummy doesn’t know diddly about training 
young soldiers, about killing the enemy and surviving to kill the next, but he can handle 
the division’s ammo. One of these days all this foolishness is going to catch up with us--
the pendulum is going to swing back and smack us all in the butt. 
“I watched this thing from the beginning. In fact, I was on the first CSM list and the 
position was fielded with no instructions. They put this position in units and never trained 
the battalion commanders or the CSMs on their relationship. My first battalion 
commander never spoke to me, never gave me instructions, so I just did what I could to 
help the First Sergeants. Everyone assumed that the CSMs knew what to do. But the 
battalion commanders didn’t know, so why should they have expected us to know? The 
Army ought to spell out what it is this CSM fellow is supposed to do. They didn’t and 
still haven’t. Sure, there was a lot of talk about being the commander’s advisor on 
enlisted matters, but soon many CSMs began to twist that from advise to command. I 
knew one thing that many of my fellow CSMs refused to consider: the First Sergeant 
worked for the company commander, not for me. That First Sergeant’s efficiency report 
was going to be written by his captain, so I had no right to be down there ordering him to 
do anything.” 
Don spoke for over an hour. He had thought much about the subject. He felt strongly 
that the reputation of the NCO corps is at risk, and he’s right. The Command Sergeants 
Major program is in need of a midcourse correction. Make no mistake about it, there is 
growing resentment among officer leaders at all levels, leaders who perceive that they 
and their soldiers suffer at the hands of CSMs who are guided by the three Ps--Perks, 
Privileges, and Politics. 
When a commander stands before a commanders’ conference and announces, “When the 
Command Sergeant Major speaks, he speaks for me,” you can bet that organization is in 
for some trying times. One large command recently endured such an experience. The 
problems all centered on the personality of its CSM and a lack of understanding of 
command responsibility on the part of the commanding general. There are many CSMs in 
the Army who with such license would still conduct themselves properly--but some 
cannot and do not. The CSM in this case immediately became a three-star tyrant. Every 
officer in that conference room knew the commander meant what he said and every one 
of them learned to resent it. 
The Sergeant Major set about to spend his new-found power in a very disruptive manner. 
He became the greatest training distractor in the command. He moved into quarters built 
for senior officers, and maneuvered the post commander into creating reserved parking 
spaces for “CSM” in already-crowded PX and commissary parking lots (right between 
those reserved for general officers and the handicapped). He then caused a command 
regulation to be written that gave him virtual veto power over every action concerning 
NCOs: hiring, firing, and Enlisted Evaluation Reports all had to have his approval. It 
soon became easier to relieve a captain company commander than to relieve a CSM. This 
placed brigade commanders in the situation of having their actions reversed if the CSM 
nonconcurred. 
The business of relieving and firing a CSM has now been written into regulations in a 
very strange manner. If a commissioned officer has been selected for command and then 
is subsequently relieved, he is not going to command again. Although not formally 
removed from a “program,” his chances of being selected to command are slim to none. 
The simple act of relief is all it takes. Not so for a CSM. After a Sergeant Major has been 
selected for the CSM program, his protection is far greater than that offered his 
commissioned commander. If he is relieved, he is not automatically removed from the 
CSM program. A formal request must be submitted, and it takes at least a major general 
to approve the removal action. 
Another indication of the dual-command mentality was seen at a division review a couple 
of years ago. As each battalion passed the reviewing stand, the announcer would state, 
“The 2d Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jones and Command Sergeant 
Major Smith!” On this particular occasion, the corps commander happened to be present 
and did not take well at all to the shared-responsibility theme, later asking the division 
commander to have another look at who was commanding what in his battalions. Every 
time we hint that NCOs are the exclusive link between the soldier and the Army, we 
further isolate the junior and senior officers from their essential troop-leading know-how. 
But what about training? What does the CSM program do for the training of young 
soldiers and NCOs? Don said it very forcefully: “There is no damn need for a CSM 
above brigade level. If Sergeants Major were doing what is really needed in our Army, 
they would be in battalions and brigades, leading and teaching. Above that level they are 
not in touch with people, and CSMs ought to be in the people business. Say what you 
want, there aren’t any people above brigade; divisions and corps are not in the people 
business, they’re in the things business.” Today in the trenches we need all the mature 
enlisted talent we can get! What a boon to the battalion and brigade to push the senior 
enlisted soldiers now in sedans back onto the firing ranges and training grounds of the 
Real Army! 
Many officers who have served at division, corps, and army level have reached the same 
conclusion. The CSM at division and corps level is more ornamental and ceremonial than 
functional. If the wrong man is placed in the position and his commander gives him free 
rein, the chances for disruption are almost assured. Obviously, there are many exceptions 
to this generalization; however, it takes only one knuckleheaded NCO (as it does with 
officers) at a high level to turn the entire command upside down. 
What does the CSM program cost the Army? Under close and tough analysis could a 
convincing case be made that it is cost-effective? That’s doubtful. The fact is that 
considerable cost is involved in the maintenance of a CSM at division, corps, major 
command, and higher level, most of which is hidden and is therefore seldom called into 
question. 
By table of organization, the CSM is not authorized a personal staff; yet almost every 
CSM has one. At a minimum, he has a driver to operate the unauthorized vehicle 
“assigned” to the CSM. At division or higher level, there is usually a clerk/typist added to 
handle the CSM’s official correspondence. At higher levels, the support can get even 
plusher. Aggregate these off-line staffs for all the CSMs across the Army, and the total of 
unauthorized people and assets becomes considerable. Further add travel expenses of 
CSMs assigned to major commands, and CSM conference costs, and the tab builds even 
more. Further add to this the costs for the time and energy expended each time the CSM 
from “higher” comes to post, and the dollar figure becomes downright alarming, 
especially in this time of diminishing resources. 
Don now serves as the first Honorary Sergeant Major for his wartime regiment, a duty he 
takes very seriously. He has visited the regiment, which is still on the rolls, and come 
away with continuing concern over CSM issues. “CSMs are too powerful, and they still 
don’t know the fine line between being the commander’s advisor and the commander’s 
informer. The fault rests with the officers. Until the officers decide what they want the 
CSMs to do and teach them to do it--well, it’s not going to get any better.” Pressed for 
solutions, he came up with the following ideas to serve as starters: 
• The commander ought to be allowed to pick his CSM. The commander and the CSM 
must be a team. Thus the commander needs someone he has professional confidence in. 
The shoe has to fit or we’ll wind up with lots of blisters. CSM reliefs and reassignment 
rates are way too high today partially because everybody but the commander concerned 
is picking his CSM. 
• There needs to be a program for CSM upward progression. They should be allowed to 
go up or lateral, but down only when they agree. But the top of the pile ought to be 
brigade. 
• The Army needs to reach a consensus on CSM duties. That consensus has to be taught 
to both officers and NCOs. Perhaps we need to study how other armies select and use 
Sergeants Major. Our British cousins have Sergeants Major, but none are Command 
Sergeants Major. 
• Commanders need to tell subordinates the limits of the CSM’s power (and there must 
be limits). Until this is done, CSMs are going to exceed their charter. 
• CSMs should be required to be First Sergeants before selection for the CSM program. 
This will slow down promotions to CSM, but those unwilling to wait probably are not the 
type that would make good CSMs to begin with. We need the type who is forced to give 
up being a First Sergeant. 
• The power to fire an NCO should be put back where it belongs, with the responsible 
commanders! Firing an NCO should result in reduction in rank. When contemplating 
relief and reduction in grade, officers must get over this business of whining, “But he was 
such a good soldier for 22 years.” 
• Revise the Sergeants Major Academy’s program of instruction so that the Academy 
produces Sergeants Major who are worth something to a battalion. We need troop 
trainers and leaders. Colonels and lieutenant colonels, not NCOs, are supposed to be 
studying national strategy. 
• Provide an environment where being an NCO is a calling, not a job. Make units a place 
where good NCOs want to serve and not just a way-station where they punch their tickets 
en route to higher levels. This is a key problem, and every officer in our Army should be 
thinking about it. 
• Make damn sure that commanders understand that the CSM’s role concerns training 
NCOs and enlisted soldiers. The training of officers is the responsibility of the officer 
corps. 
The Army’s Command Sergeants Major program is a soldier program that, if not broken, 
at least needs an awful lot of fine-tuning. There are hundreds of superb CSMs in the 
Army working their hearts out for their soldiers and their units. If we can get all of them 
working and pulling in the same direction, it will make our Army the best in the world. It 
cannot be done without NCOs and their proven dedication. But the basic task of fixing 
the program, and thus getting our senior enlisteds to sing from the same sheet of music, 
rests with the senior officer corps. 
Our Army has been blessed by having soldiers like Frank, Henry, and Don. We are all 
better for having had them march among us. Their loyalty and love of service and 
mastery of soldiering have inspired all who have had the honor to serve with them. In our 
rush to accept the modern equipage into our ranks, we would do well to pause and reflect 
on the Franks, the Henrys, and the Dons. They provide a vision of an NCO corps which, 
despite its rough edges and imperfections, served this nation nobly. In our commendable 
effort to further professionalize the corps, it is vital that we not turn it into a legion of 
rarified and perfumed princes, fitter to carry a tale than a rifle or a wounded comrade. 
 
NOTES 
1. For rhetorical convenience, the authors refer to themselves in the first-person singular 
in scenes portraying their experiences with NCOs. However, the particular experiences as 
recounted pertained to only one or the other of the authors, not to both. 
2. Department of the Army, Army Command Policy and Procedures, Army Regulation 
600-20 (Washington: GPO, 1986). See para. 2-3 and 4-2. 
3. Department of the Army, The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide. Field Manual 
22-600-20 (Washington: GPO, 1986). See particularly pp. 21-24, 47-49. 
 
Brigadier General John C. “Doc” Bahnsen (USMA, 1956), who retired in 1986 after over 
30 years of service, has known many command sergeants major. He spent his last eight 
years of duty at brigade, division, corps, and army level. He commanded a platoon, troop, 
and squadron in combat, and a platoon, company, battalion, and brigade in Germany or 
the United States. He was an Assistant Division Commander of the 2d Armored Division, 
Chief of Staff of the Combined Field Army in Korea, and Chief of Staff of III Corps at 
Fort Hood. He was wounded during each of his two tours in Vietnam and wears a 
Distinguished Service Cross and five Silver Stars among numerous decorations. 
Colonel James W. Bradin, a product of the Citadel (BA, 1958) and Auburn (MA, 1977), 
retired in 1987 after 29 1/2 years of service. An armor officer and aviator, he has 
commanded a platoon and troop in Vietnam, where he served two tours, a platoon and 
company in Korea, and a battalion in the United States. From 1982 to 1984, he was 
Commandant of Cadets at the Citadel, and concluded his career as Inspector General of V 
Corps in Germany. Colonel Bradin numbers among his decorations four Silver Stars, two 
Legions of Merit, the Distinguished Flying Cross, three Bronze Stars, and the Purple 
Heart. 
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